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Abstract
Successful conservation depends as much on people working together as it
does on sound science and good governance. Research on cooperation in busi-
nesses, economics, psychology, and natural resource management has iden-
tified shared social and social-ecological dynamics, reviewed and categorized
in this article that can create unwanted surprises and problems for conserva-
tion efforts. Cooperation may fail when: (1) individual and group benefits are
in conflict (social dilemmas) or (2) social-ecological systems become caught
in problem-causing and problem-enhancing feedbacks (SES traps). Knowing
about and recognizing these dynamics can help decision makers to understand
and change key elements of problems and learn from the experiences of others.
Social dilemmas have winners and losers, and involve give-some or take-some
choices; SES traps are lose-lose situations. Solutions to problems of cooper-
ation in conservation contexts involve identifying the conservation objective
and context, diagnosing systemic social dilemmas and SES traps, and develop-
ing practical solutions that work with group processes and individuals toward
shared and positively reinforcing goals, goal structures, and expectations. Re-
search on cooperation in conservation has largely ignored problems of scale,
scaling, and group heterogeneity. The field would benefit from a shift from a
probabilistic, empirical approach to a stronger theory-driven, mechanistic, and
more diagnostic approach.
Introduction
The importance of “creative cooperation” for conserva-
tion was noted over 30 years ago in one of conservation
biology’s seminal texts (Soule 1986, p.11). As the scale of
conservation initiatives has increased, the need for coop-
eration in conservation continues to grow (Guerrero et al.
2015). In many locations, conservation is also expected to
contribute to community development objectives via col-
laborations between conservation biologists, NGOs, and
local communities (Berkes 2004). Deep understandings
of cooperation and how it can be achieved are therefore
essential for effective conservation practice. The literature
on cooperation has not been previously synthesized in a
conservation context, however, and the mechanisms un-
derlying the success or failure of cooperative efforts in
conservation (e.g., through creation of unintended feed-
backs; Larrosa et al. (2016)) remain unclear.
A lack of cooperation in conservation may arise for
many reasons. Individual willingness to cooperate, for
example, may be reduced by differences in values and
perceptions, problematic interpersonal dynamics, asym-
metries in power, or a lack of clarity on benefits and
tradeoffs (e.g., Waylen et al. 2010; Dharmawan et al.
2016; Paloniemi et al. 2017). However, resolving one or
more of these concerns (e.g., by providing more scientific
information and improving community representation
in decision making) does not always work. Although
each failure may appear unique, research has identified a
number of recurring system dynamics that can create un-
wanted surprises and/or problems in efforts to solve prob-
lems of resource use and management. Recognizing these
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dynamics in conservation can help people to understand
their own difficulties and learn from the experiences of
others when resolving them.
The scope of this review includes conservation and nat-
ural resource management and related research in eco-
nomics, psychology, and business management. I will:
(1) explain management syndromes and propose a new
typology of dilemma and trap situations in natural re-
source management; (2) present a comprehensive sum-
mary, based on an exhaustive literature search, of dif-
ferent kinds of dilemma and trap; (3) explain some of
the additional complexities that may arise in conserva-
tion management; and (4) discuss potential solutions to
social dilemmas.
Introducing management syndromes
“Management syndromes” are characteristic sets of co-
occurring actor and system behaviors, such as overhar-
vesting or social conflict, that negatively impact natural
resources and/or the communities that depend on them.
Formal analysis of management syndromes as a paradigm
for research on global sustainability was proposed by
Schellnhuber et al. (1997) and Lu¨deke et al. (1999). Clark
et al. (2005) have argued that the “semi-quantitative,
yet fully formalized techniques . . . employed in syn-
dromes analysis, hold a huge potential for . . . scientific
description of complex systems characterized by strong
nature–society interactions.” Some examples of specific
management syndromes that have received attention in
conservation biology include shifting baseline syndrome
(Pauly 1995; Papworth et al. 2009), Sahel syndrome
(Lu¨deke et al. 1999), and the “pathology of natural re-
source management” (Holling & Meffe 1996).
The literature on management syndromes in conser-
vation can be traced to three different schools. The first
and oldest of these focuses on social dilemmas, which are
also referred to as “social traps” (e.g., Platt 1973; Barry &
Bateman 1996). This school draws heavily on perspec-
tives on human behavior derived from economics, game
theory, evolutionary theory, and experimental psychol-
ogy. It includes many mechanistic and experimental ap-
proaches to human behavior and contains a considerable
wealth of detail and ideas. A good overview of this litera-
ture is provided by Van Lange et al. (2013).
Second, there is a body of research in ecology and en-
vironmental science that uses a systems perspective to di-
agnose and resolve or avoid social-ecological traps (e.g.,
Lebel et al. 2011; Enfors 2013). To avoid potential con-
fusion with “social trap,” I will limit my use of “trap” to
discussions of social-ecological systems (SES) traps. SES
traps describe core natural and human elements of con-
servation management problems, focusing on key dy-
namics such as feedbacks between different system com-
ponents and their influence on social-ecological adapta-
tion and transformation (Carpenter & Brock 2008; En-
fors 2009). Analyses of SES traps generally do not use
or offer in-depth perspectives on actor motivations and
psychology.
Third, there has been a considerable amount of
conservation-related research on the problems of sus-
tainable management and resource harvesting. This lit-
erature deals with styles of management (e.g., command
and control management, adaptive management) and the
management problems that commonly arise in social-
ecological systems (Holling & Meffe 1996; Walters 1997;
Gunderson 1999; Gunderson & Light 2006). It differs
from the SES trap literature by largely ignoring or sim-
plifying the complexity of social feedbacks to managers
and resource users (often excluding people as actors in
ecological models) and in its focus on how to manage
variance in the supply of ecosystem services (Carpen-
ter & Brock 2006). Its primary modus operandi has been
to use a scenario-based or pseudoexperimental mod-
eling approach to inform management decisions (e.g.,
Wadsworth et al. 2000), without questioning manager
goals and motivations. For example, the parameters of
an ecological limit to growth model of an expanding her-
bivore population in a small protected area may be ma-
nipulated to explore alternative management strategies
(Starfield & Bleloch 1991). Many management problems,
such as failures of adaptive management efforts (Walters
1997), can be more deeply understood from the perspec-
tive of individual motivations as either social dilemma or
SES trap situations.
A framework for management
syndromes in conservation
Strictly speaking, a dilemma is a form of logical prob-
lem to which there are only two alternative solutions or
responses, and both are unfavorable. Responses to logi-
cal dilemma problems in philosophical argument gener-
ally involve either exposing the dilemma as a fallacy, re-
framing it as a compromise, or finding a third solution
that the original problem statement did not consider. For
example, on islands off the coast of South Africa, en-
dangered White Pelicans feed on the chicks of endan-
gered Cape Gannets and Cape Cormorants (Mwema et al.
2010). Should managers enhance the survival of the pel-
icans by letting them forage on other endangered species;
or protect gannets and cormorants, with negative impacts
on the pelican population? The horns of this dilemma can
be escaped by identifying the other assumptions on which
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the argument is predicated, which include: (1) that the
pelicans have no alternate food source (they do); (2) that
a single choice must be followed (it would also be an op-
tion to sometimes favor one species and sometimes the
other); (3) that impacts on juvenile survivorship are suf-
ficient to affect population sizes of both species (currently
unclear); and (4) that protection is a viable option (on
uninhabited offshore islands).
Platt (1973) defined social dilemmas explicitly as situ-
ations in which there is opposition between a highly mo-
tivating short-term reward (or punishment) for an action
and its long-term consequences. Social dilemmas also in-
clude situations in which individual and group benefits
are in conflict (Barry & Bateman 1996). In game theory, a
dilemma game is one in which all players have dominat-
ing positions that result in a deficient equilibrium (Dawes
1980; Macy & Flache 2002). Van Lange et al. (2013) have
proposed an all-inclusive definition of social dilemmas
as “situations in which a noncooperative course of ac-
tion is (at times) tempting for each individual in that
it yields superior (often short-term) outcomes for self,
and if all pursue this noncooperative course of action, all
are (often in the longer-term) worse off than if all had
cooperated.”
These definitions of social dilemmas are distinct from
definitions of SES traps, which are viewed as persistent,
self-reinforcing system dynamics (i.e., situations that are
maintained by strong feedback loops) with negative out-
comes for people and/or ecosystems (Carpenter & Brock
2008; Enfors 2009; Cinner 2011; Enfors 2013). Cinner
(2011), for example, defined SES traps as occurring when
“feedbacks between social and ecological systems lead to-
ward an undesirable state that may be difficult or impos-
sible to reverse.” It is taken for granted here that “un-
desirable” describes the perspective of all of the actors in
the problem situation, reflecting the principle that both
individuals and groups generally emerge as losers in SES
traps. SES traps do not necessarily involve true dilem-
mas, in the form of conflicts between individual or near-
term outcomes and collective or long-term consequences.
Poverty traps and rigidity traps, for example, involve both
short- and long-term losses to both individuals and soci-
ety (Carpenter & Brock 2008; Kim & Loury 2014).
Many other kinds of “trap” described in the SES
literature are better described as social dilemmas. A
“gilded trap,” for instance, occurs when group actions
resulting from economically attractive opportunities
outweigh concerns over associated social and ecological
risks or consequences (Steneck et al. 2011). If fishing in a
fleet yields economic benefits for a group, high financial
rewards for individuals within the group can create a
strong reinforcing feedback that deepens the trap. Its
fundamental dynamic is that of a classical social dilemma
in which short-term and long-term benefits are traded
off against each other.
Such confusion arises easily because the study of man-
agement syndromes in the context of conservation and
natural resource management has lacked a clear orga-
nizing framework that integrates perspectives on social
dilemmas and SES traps. Brewer & Kramer (1986) made
an important distinction between “give some” and “take
some” dilemmas. Give-some problems involve a higher
cost or loss to the individual than to the group, while
take-some problems involve a higher cost or loss to the
group. Although this division does not directly include
“give or take some” (GOTS) dilemmas, which share ele-
ments of both (McCarter et al. 2011), it provides a sen-
sible organizing framework from which GOTS dilemmas
can also be approached.
If we define SES traps strictly as situations in which
both individuals and groups stand to lose, then contrast-
ing group outcomes (positive or negative) against individ-
ual outcomes (positive or negative) suggest four funda-
mentally different kinds of management syndrome that
are relevant to conservation (Figure 1). A wide range of
examples (reviewed in Table 1) has been documented
in each category. Many of these examples will be unfa-
miliar to conservation biologists. Awareness of traps and
tradeoffs in politically sensitive situations is important,
however, particularly for those who must navigate com-
plex interpersonal dynamics in order to achieve conserva-
tion goals. Figure 1 and Table 1 provide examples against
which a specific conservation problem can be considered.
Once a management syndrome has been diagnosed, it be-
comes easier to solve.
Additional complexities
In complex decision-making situations, awareness of po-
tential confounding factors and unexpected outcomes
can help managers to plan and improve their approach.
Resolution of social dilemmas and SES traps in conser-
vation can be complicated by: (1) system dynamics; (2)
the nature of lock-in; (3) questions of scale and hetero-
geneity; and (4) the psychology of choice and decision
making.
System dynamics
SES trap and social dilemma situations develop over time.
Changes in system dynamics can be counterintuitive and
difficult to predict, particularly when they involve struc-
tural changes within a system rather than simple incre-
mental change. It is important that the potential con-
sequences and knock-on effects of conservation actions
are considered carefully and critically before they are
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Figure 1 The three different kinds of management syndrome, and examples of each.
This framework contrasts the four different combinations of individual benefits and group benefits. The time scales for different actors are difficult to
portray graphically, but as indicated by Platt (1973), the assignment of a lower value to more distant benefits plays an important role in social dilemma
situations because individual costs and benefits are often, but not always, more immediately experienced, more tangible, and more sure to be received
than group benefits. For example, deciding to take a bus rather than a car to work in order to reduce carbon dioxide emissions is a worthy long-term
contribution to society, but its benefits to the individual are likely to be much less obvious than the convenience of driving. The social dilemmas and SES
traps associated with each box are discussed in more detail in Table 1 and the following text.
undertaken. For example, the economist T. S. Jevons
showed for the coal industry in England that more ef-
ficient use of coal had led to higher (not lower) net use
(Alcott 2005). Similarly, efforts to reduce electricity con-
sumption using energy-efficient vending machines led to
greater overall environmental impacts by making ma-
chines more affordable (Polimeni 2012). Jevons’s para-
dox illustrates how attempts to manipulate complex sys-
tems can backfire.
Another example of an unexpected system dynamic
is termed the Streisand effect, after the singer Bar-
bara Streisand (Zuckerman 2014). It refers to the phe-
nomenon whereby an attempt to hide, remove, or censor
a piece of information has the unintended consequence
of publicizing the information more widely, usually fa-
cilitated by the Internet. Streisand complained to Google
Earth about her house being too visible in their imagery,
and publicity around her request led to thousands of peo-
ple going online to see it. The Streisand effect may lead
to surprises in conservation, for instance if agencies un-
intentionally build up much greater than intended public
interest in a rare or fragile species by restricting habitat
access and/or trying to conceal information on its loca-
tion.
Clearly, if selfish and/or short-term behavior can in-
crease the rewards for such behaviors, individuals may
get stuck in a self-reinforcing feedback. In this way, the
creation of social dilemmas and SES traps can show
strong path dependence (i.e., a system’s later dynamics
depend strongly on its starting point). Boonstra & de Boer
(2014) have argued that social dilemmas are better un-
derstood as processes than as situations, and that enter-
ing a dilemma or SES trap situation depends on a critical
sequence of events at a critical juncture in time.
As problems develop, the nature of some actions or sys-
tem elements may change. Actions that initially yield pos-
itive outcomes but start to produce progressively more
negative outcomes, or small interventions that have a
beneficial effect while larger interventions of the same
kind have a negative effect, are termed “sliding rein-
forcers” (Costanza 1987). Recreational and medicinal
drugs are examples of sliding reinforcers. In conservation
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Table 1 A summary of the three different kinds of potentially problematic syndromes in conservation biology and natural resource management:
give-some dilemmas, take-some dilemmas, and SES traps. This table summarizes dilemmas, traps, and “systems archetypes” from several different fields
Syndrome type and
definition Dilemma name Explanation Example(s)
Give-some dilemmas Public goods dilemma or
social fence
An action that results in some
cost to an individual leads to
an increased benefit for
society, but only if
sufficiently many people
cooperate (Platt 1973).
Recycling, climate change (reducing carbon emissions),
traffic congestion (e.g., taking public transport or
avoiding car use).
Delayed social fence
dilemma
As above, but with a delay
between action and
outcome (Van Lange et al.
2013).
Reductions in charitable donations lead to closure of local
conservation programs; loss of a conservation
organization’s positive culture due to employees’
unwillingness to engage in extra role (or organizational
citizenship) behaviors, such as helping new employees
adjust.
Volunteer dilemma or
missing hero dilemma
Achieving a goal that benefits
the group depends on the
willingness of one or more
individuals to give up their
time or incur other costs
(Barry & Bateman 1996).
Attend meetings and social events with potential
conservation donors; leading a group-written scientific
paper or proposal, or organizing a workshop.
Countertrap dilemma Similar to missing hero; the
cost of encouraging
give-some behaviors or
countering take-some
behaviors becomes too high
for an individual (Platt 1973).
A conservation manager’s short-term personal interest in
avoiding a bothersome confrontation with a protected
area visitor or employee precludes action that will
create long-term benefits.
Shifting burden to
intervenor
A different kind of give-some
dilemma in which a
well-meaning external agent
provides short-term
intervention to solve a
problem and becomes
central to its continued
solution. Following their
departure, the system
degrades or collapses
(Senge 1990).
Common dilemma for aid agencies and conservation
NGOs that focus on problem solving or conservation
efforts without sufficient capacity building.
Externality dilemma, also
termed an
“asymmetric trap”
Differences in the costs or
rewards experienced by
individuals who exert
equivalent effort can lead
those receiving higher costs
or lower benefits becoming
less cooperative, reducing
overall group benefits
(Murnighan et al. 1990).
Jealousy or corruption within a conservation organization
can lead to in-fighting and a reduction in its
effectiveness.
Take-some dilemmas Tragedy of the commons A common property resource
is overexploited when
individuals seek additional
benefits by taking more
than their fair share (Hardin
1968).
Many common conservation problems: overgrazing,
overfishing, overhunting.
(Continued)
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Table 1 Continued
Syndrome type and
definition Dilemma name Explanation Example(s)
Success to the
successful;
winner-takes-all;
economics over
ecosystems
A successful individual is able
to access more resources
and use them become
increasingly more
successful, leading to rising
social inequity and injustice
at the group level (Senge
1990).
Capitalism; habitat fragmentation by development;
takeovers of indigenous property for protected area
creation.
Gilded “trap” dilemma A collective, operating
unsustainably, makes such
high profits that they are
unwilling to lower their
harvesting levels to reduce
environmental impact
(Steneck et al. 2011).
Overfishing on the high seas.
Growth and
underinvestment
As a company or a
conservation initiative
grows, individuals extract
too much of the benefit and
fail to invest sufficient
resources in continued
success (Senge 1990).
A conservation organization that focuses on species
conservation without engaging in outreach and
providing benefits to the surrounding human
community “takes” conservation benefits but slowly
loses local credibility and political support, eventually
leading to a failure of the initiative.
Prisoner’s dilemma In situations where the
potential payoff from
defecting is higher but less
assured than that of
cooperating, individuals
may decide to defect
(Dawes 1980).
Corruption in conservation. A single corrupt individual
may be able to benefit unfairly from
conservation-derived revenue, but if several individuals
help themselves to proceeds or extort bribes, then the
entire initiative may lose credibility and collapse.
Lose-lose syndromes:
SES traps
Poverty trap Escaping poverty requires
having capital to invest in a
business. Those living in
poverty have no capital and
struggle to raise it
(Rosenstein-Rodan 1961).
“Hungry people cannot do conservation”; fishermen
living in poverty overexploit fish stocks because they
see no alternative.
Integrality and
modularity traps
Integrality traps occur when a
firm or organization remains
integrated even if
technology becomes more
modular. The firmmust then
develop an administrative
approach to accomplish
what other firms achieve
through the market.
Modularity traps describe
the inverse; getting stuck in
a modular way of doing
things when it makes better
sense to be integrated
(Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995).
Integrality: protected area managers who insist on doing
all their own research and monitoring, when university
researchers could do it more efficiently and more
cheaply; or refuse to outsource loss-making
accommodation or catering services. Modularity:
having endangered species conservation plans
developed and applied individually, by state or
province, instead of nationally, can lead to local
inefficiencies and potential overall failure.
(Continued)
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Table 1 Continued
Syndrome type and
definition Dilemma name Explanation Example(s)
Lock-in traps: rigidity,
specialization,
competency, and
propinquity traps
A set of closely allied traps
that reflect an unwillingness
to change.
Lack of flexibility is common in governmental resource
management agencies, where people are often kept
too busy “doing what they have always done” to
confront change.
Rigidity trap: organizations
cannot or will not change an
approach during a crisis
because management
structures/institutions are
too inflexible to adapt
(Gunderson 1999, Butler &
Goldstein 2010).
Rigidity, specialization, and competency traps are
common in conservation biology when better
approaches and/or new information are developed but
conservation organizations refuse to adopt them. For
example, new management perspectives on fire
suppression were slow to be adopted by fire specialists
in the United States. Failure to move on both harms the
individual and wastes group resources.
Specialization trap: an
individual or organization
becomes specialized in a
single area and becomes
redundant when conditions
change (Levitt & March
1988).
Competency trap: a person or
organization becomes good
at doing something and
keeps doing it that way,
even when better ways of
doing it are
available—hence gradually
becomes obsolete.
Propinquity trap: new
solutions are assumed to be
similar to previous
solutions, curtailing original
and more effective
solutions. Maturity traps
(hiring only seasoned
workers or using only tried
and trusted solutions) and
familiarity traps (favoring
the familiar over better but
less familiar alternatives)
are specific cases of the
same phenomenon (Ahuja &
Morris Lampert 2001).
Like rigidity traps, propinquity traps arise in conservation
when organizations are reluctant to embrace entirely
new ideas and approaches, even when current
methods are failing. For example, management of
rhinoceros poaching focused for many years almost
entirely on controlling illegal hunting, even when it
became obvious that this was only part of the solution.
Arms race (escalation) Competition between
continually evolving
competitors leads to
increasingly specialized and
expensive investment in
defense or competition for
one kind of situation, both
reducing available capital
for other ventures and
creating vulnerabilities in
other areas.
In protecting populations of endangered species,
increasingly sophisticated poachers and antipoaching
operations.
(Continued)
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Table 1 Continued
Syndrome type and
definition Dilemma name Explanation Example(s)
Fixes that fail An attempted solution fails to
work. Instead of trying a
different approach, a
greater quantity or higher
level of the same solution is
attempted (Senge 1990).
Many common problems in natural resource
management. For example, captive breeding programs
that try to release increasingly more individuals into
sink areas; constructing more and more
accommodation to try to revive failing ecotourism
initiatives; efforts to control supply without considering
demand.
Diminishing returns After an initially promising
period, the marginal return
on an investment begins to
decline. Eventually,
expenditure to achieve the
same return becomes too
high to maintain. By then,
the expenditure is locked-in
(Boserup 1981).
Common in situations where resources or habitats are
spatially distributed. Initial efforts focus on nearer and
richer resource patches and/or populations that are
easiest to conserve; subsequent efforts must go
further and exploit (or conserve) less rich patches,
leading to increased costs and declining returns. In
conservation, may occur in land-purchasing programs.
Process-delay trap When there is a lag between
an action and a system
response, managers can
become trapped in a
reactive cycle that erodes
political trust and support
(Senge 1990).
Habitat restoration or population protection for a slowly
growing or late-maturing organism may take decades
to yield obvious benefits, leading to claims of
conservation failure and abandonment of programs.
For example, sea turtle conservation, assessment of
effectiveness of marine no-take zones.
Sunk cost trap or
Concorde effect
Rational decisions are
impeded by the amount of
effort or capital that has
already been invested in a
project or product, even
though this is not directly
relevant to decisions about
its future (Arkes & Ayton
1999).
Classical problem in monitoring, where many long-term
monitoring efforts that are useless for management or
scientific knowledge are perpetuated simply because
they exist. Also arises in such cases as unsuccessful
captive breeding programs, refusal to change poorly
designated protected area boundaries, and allowing
existing infrastructure (roads, buildings, boat landings)
to dictate future development plans for protected
areas.
Source-sink trap This is a spatially explicit trap
in which an area that is a net
producer of organisms or
other mobile resources (a
source) is physically or
economically connected to
another area that is a net
consumer (a sink). Resource
depletion in the sink area
can deplete the source
population and/or reduce its
growth rate and benefits
(Dias 1996).
Ecological trap: sink areas in buffer zones of protected
areas (van der Meer et al. 2014).
contexts, sliding reinforcers can include such phenomena
as the construction of infrastructure (roads may allow an
area to benefit from ecotourism, but also facilitate the en-
trance of undesirable influences, such as poaching); grad-
ual changes in the demands of resource users (e.g., un-
reasonable expectations for increases in hunting quotas
that were originally designed to facilitate responsible co-
management); pesticide and fertilizer use (small amounts
can improve crop yields, but overuse harms the environ-
ment); and deliberately introduced exotic species, such
as biocontrol agents, that are initially beneficial but sub-
sequently become invasive.
Feedbacks may influence the values of two variables of
interest in the same direction simultaneously, meaning
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that correlations and other simple statistics are not suited
to detecting them. In general, detecting the effects of con-
servation actions on social-ecological dynamics and feed-
backs requires monitoring elements of both the social
and the ecological system (Reyers et al. 2013) and mak-
ing sense of change through a formal systems model that
refers to a suitable baseline (Cumming & Collier 2005;
Cumming et al. 2005).
The nature of lock-in
Lock-in of social dilemmas occurs when it is difficult for
individuals or groups to change their behaviors without
incurring a large penalty (whether social, political, or eco-
nomic). Platt (1973) described three forms of locked-in
situations in collective action (group action) problems:
the invisible hand, the invisible fist, and the invisible
chain. The invisible hand, following Adam Smith, em-
phasizes the role of markets and aggregated individual
choice in creating and stabilizing group norms. Repeated
interactions between people lead to an accepted set of
norms and behaviors that guide individual actions with-
out necessarily requiring formal expression. The invisible
fist, by contrast, arises when competition does not pro-
duce stability, but instead leads to escalation or elimina-
tion. Platt (1973) placed arms races in this category. Last,
the invisible chain arises when repeated interactions be-
tween two or more people form “self-maintaining sys-
tems” that can be both detrimental and very hard to get
out of. Platt (1973) used the example of a married couple
in an abusive relationship; interactions between govern-
ments and other stakeholders can fall into similarly neg-
ative and distrustful patterns.
Other authors have proposed additional forms of lock-
in. Path dependence, for example, may create or maintain
lock-in to a particular solution, either through its contin-
ued influence on a society (e.g., via spatially segregated
geographies, such as postapartheid settlement patterns in
South Africa, that have high inertia; Vanderschuren &
Galaria (2003)) or because events in the past reduce the
range of solutions that people are willing to consider as
currently acceptable. For example, achieving cooperation
between different user groups along a river catchment
may become much harder if there is a history of past con-
flict between groups (Cumming 2011).
Nested traps involve locked-in behavior at many inter-
related levels of analysis (Platt 1973; Barry & Bateman
1996). Resolving problems in these situations is difficult,
because parts of the system may be ready for change
while others are not (Westley et al. 2002); Allison &
Hobbs (2004), for example, suggest that macroeconomic
influences have locked-in elements of natural resource
management in Western Australian agriculture in ways
that are extremely difficult for regional governments to
overcome.
For conservation managers, the problem of lock-in
must be considered from two perspectives; internally
(i.e., that of their own organization and its goals), and
externally (i.e., that of stakeholders.) Resolving internal
lock-in problems may require a reassessment of organi-
zational priorities, which in turn means initiating change
and self-reflection within the organization. External
lock-in problems may be harder to resolve, and either
acknowledged or included within the problem-solving
approach (e.g., if a partner refuses to modify their data
collection protocol even though much of the information
it generates is irrelevant) or left unresolved until a
suitable window of opportunity for change arises.
Questions of scale and heterogeneity
One of the most fundamental system attributes in any
dilemma or SES trap situation is that of group size. Many
social variables, such as levels of trust and reciprocity, are
influenced by the number of people in a group. As human
groups grow or shrink, they may move into trap situa-
tions to which they would be less vulnerable if they were
smaller or larger. The structure of interactions within a
group is also important for system dynamics (Cumming
2016). Control over system behaviors may reside at one
level, or at several different hierarchical levels within an
organization. Differences in the nature of system control
dictate the nature of the solutions that are needed, and in
particular, whether actions should target individuals or
groups. Barry & Bateman (1996) differentiate between
private and dispersed problem solving; private problem
solving can often be undertaken by a single individual,
whereas dispersed problems require group processes to
resolve.
Group size and the nature of control relate closely to
questions of heterogeneity; or more specifically, to dif-
ferences between the stakeholders who are engaged in a
particular conservation situation. Larger groups are usu-
ally more heterogeneous than small groups in a num-
ber of ways, including race, gender, educational back-
ground, personality types, and relevant character traits.
Heterogeneity may function as a strength or a weak-
nesses in conservation problem solving. The proportion
of altruists within a group, for example, can have impor-
tant implications for group dynamics (Fehr & Fischbacher
2003). Heterogeneous outcomes can inhibit cooperative
behavior, for example, if people perceive that others in
the group will receive higher payoffs despite making
equivalent contributions (Murnighan et al. 1990; Barry &
Bateman 1996).
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Managers who are aware of the potential costs and
benefits arising from heterogeneity can actively main-
tain a suitable level of heterogeneity among their em-
ployees; make members of minorities feel included and
accepted within the group; and invite known altruists to
participate in conservation initiatives. Similarly, as con-
servation organizations or working groups grow larger,
leaders must learn to delegate power, to ensure that dif-
ferent voices within the group are heard, and to ac-
cept the additional transaction costs (e.g., more time
spent discussing possible solutions) that arise from greater
heterogeneity.
The psychology of choice and decision making
Publications in conservation and ecology journals sel-
dom consider manager motivations and individual psy-
chology in any depth (Clements et al. 2016). Although
game theory explains how rational humans should be-
have to maximize their own self-interest, groups are
seldom truly rational. More useful perspectives on co-
operation have been developed in psychology: specif-
ically, interdependence theory and goal expectation
theory.
Interdependence theory proposes that the way in
which goals are structured determines how individu-
als interact (Deutsch 1949; Johnson & Johnson 2005).
Group cohesion (e.g., in a business or a stakeholder
group) is provided by shared goals. Goal structure is de-
fined as the nature of interdependence within the group.
Positive interdependence exists when people can attain their
goals if, and only if, the other individuals in the group
also attain their goals. Negative interdependence exists when
people perceive that they can only attain their goals if
others in the group do not attain their goals (Johnson &
Johnson 2005). Positive interdependence leads to “pro-
motive action,” in which individuals promote the suc-
cess of others, while negative interdependence leads to
“oppositional action” (Deutsch 1949). Importantly, peo-
ple’s choices and resulting interactions with others de-
pend on their perceptions of whether interdependence
within the group is positive, negative, or absent (indepen-
dent). Deutsch (1949) proposed that cooperation tends
to induce further cooperation, while opposition induces
further opposition. It is therefore more likely that peo-
ple compromise or make unselfish choices, and continue
to do so, in situations where positive interdependence is
clear. For example, in managing water supply and de-
mand, changing stakeholder perceptions of water from a
limited resource that others are depleting (negative goal
structuring) to that of a shared resource that will only
be available if everyone adjusts their water usage (pos-
itive structuring) can have a significant political impact
(Olsson et al. 2004). For conservation, interdependence
theory suggests that it is important that leaders present a
clear goal structure to participants; that they make deci-
sions transparently and inclusively; and that conservation
action is not perceived as preferentially benefitting a sin-
gle individual or group.
Goal expectation theory (Pruitt & Kimmel 1977) pro-
poses that cooperation depends on individuals both hav-
ing a goal of mutual cooperation and expecting others to
cooperate. These assumptions are particularly important
in public goods dilemmas (De Cremer & Stouten 2003).
For example, people are less likely to litter if they feel
that others are also taking care not to do so. For conser-
vation managers and decision makers, goal expectation
theory suggests that both leading by example and public
recognition of the contributions of collaborators to group
objectives are important for success.
A large number of experimental games have been de-
veloped to further explore the basis of cooperation, both
for individuals and groups (Dufwenberg et al. 2011). This
research has produced some intriguing outcomes with
high relevance for conservation. For example, behavior
is determined by utility (i.e., the total satisfaction re-
ceived from an action, such as consuming a good or ser-
vice), not only by its payoff. Depending on net utility,
which generally includes moral and relational elements,
actions with lower payoffs may be favored; and coop-
eration is reduced when decision makers view a social
dilemma as a business decision, rather than as an eth-
ical decision or a social decision (Van Lange et al. 2013).
Conservation managers should therefore be willing to ap-
peal to the values of stakeholders and to present conser-
vation goals in ways that connect clearly to their core
beliefs.
Last, human idiosyncrasies influence the likelihood of
entering a dilemma or trap situation. For example, peo-
ple tend to overlook distant times, places, and failures,
creating a set of “learning myopias” (Levinthal & March
1993) that can influence their actions and make it harder
to learn from the experiences of others. Similarly, the
desire to measure performance and set targets can itself
become a trap; Campbell’s law proposes that “The more
any quantitative social indicator is used for social decision
making, the more subject it will be to corruption pres-
sures and the more apt it will be to distort and corrupt
the social processes it is intended to monitor” (Campbell
1979). In conservation initiatives, awareness of the risks
of learning myopias and of setting potentially prescriptive
performance targets can help managers to avoid these is-
sues by deliberately considering distant times, places, and
failures; and periodically re-evaluating the value and im-
pact of quantitative social indicators and individual per-
formance measures.
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Potential solutions
Proposed solutions to social dilemmas and SES traps have
ranged from general theoretical observations to specific
practical suggestions. Social science as a discipline has not
been strongly solution-oriented (Watts 2017), however,
and it can be difficult to identify areas of consensus within
the existing literature. Solutions to dilemma and trap sit-
uations in conservation have three main components: (1)
assessment of the conservation context; (2) diagnosis of
which dilemmas and/or traps are most relevant; and (3)
implementation of practical solutions (see also Waltner-
Toews & Kay 2005).
Assessment of the conservation context
The context in which conservation is being undertaken,
and the objectives of the conservation manager or or-
ganization, are central to cooperation. Conservation ob-
jectives provide a frame of reference against which the
value of an individual action can be assessed (Game
et al. 2014). Many discussions of social dilemmas and
SES traps have also disregarded the thorny contextual
questions of perception and subjectivity; notably, con-
cerns over power dynamics, asymmetric outcomes, and
potential winners and losers (Robbins 2004). Even in
situations where mediation rather than direct interven-
tion is required, a mandate is required for intervention.
In sociopolitical situations, the means by which an end
is attained are often more important than the end itself
(Adger & Jordan 2009). In addition, the success of in-
terventions in social dynamics typically depends on the
negotiation of shared belief structures and recognition
that a problem exists. When there are multiple stake-
holders and the objectives of different actors are unclear,
the conservation context can be defined—and poten-
tially influenced—through formal processes of stake-
holder engagement, problem framing, and scenario plan-
ning (Peterson et al. 2003; Poteete et al. 2010; Sterling
et al. 2017).
Diagnosis of dilemmas and SES traps
Dilemma and SES trap situations in conservation of-
ten occur when different actors (whether individuals or
organizations) have different agendas, understandings,
and/or costs and benefits. Conservation managers and
stakeholders do not necessarily see the “bigger picture”
system dynamics and feedbacks that make conservation
problems hard to resolve. For example, in understanding
deforestation and its relationship to agriculture, the im-
portance of slowly changing system variables such as soil
fertility, groundwater levels, or societal attitudes can be
particularly difficult to identify in the absence of a sys-
tems approach (Walker et al. 2006).
Several authors have proposed that the best way to di-
agnose a problem situation is to run scenario planning or
resilience analysis workshops with stakeholders (Walker
et al. 2002). Systems models are key elements of such pro-
cesses (Addison et al. 2013). Participatory workshops fa-
cilitate a public discourse around the problem and can
lead to a shared understanding of the problem, making
it simpler to agree upon and implement solutions. Par-
ticipatory workshops can also inflame conflict and en-
trench existing differences (Friedman & Cousins 1996),
however, and so it is important that participants are se-
lected carefully and constructively engaged prior to public
debate.
Dawes (1980) reviewed game-playing studies and
identified knowledge, morality, and trust as important
elements of solutions to social dilemmas. Actors who
are seeking to resolve social dilemmas must build indi-
vidual and group relationships first, before attempting
to achieve change, and wait patiently for windows of
opportunity in which to influence outcomes. Some of
the most successful examples of cooperation in conser-
vation have been supported by the behind-the-scenes,
community-building efforts of a charismatic leader (Ols-
son et al. 2004). The widespread nature of cooperation
problems suggests that awareness of simple archetypal
systems models of social dilemmas and SES traps (e.g.,
as presented by Senge 1990), and efforts to apply them,
would be valuable for diagnosis (Bennett et al. 2005).
Implementation of practical solutions
Platt (1973) made six practical suggestions for resolving
social dilemmas: (1) change the delay (to bring long-term
rewards forward, or make consequences bear more di-
rectly on behavior); (2) add counter-reinforcers, such as
social incentives, sanctions, or punishments; (3) change
the nature of the long-run consequence; (4) improve
the benefits but not the costs of a better alternative
(e.g., coke zero vs. coke classic, electronic cigarettes);
(5) get outside help in changing the reinforcement pat-
terns of feedback loops; and (6) set up a superordinate
authority, such as a complaints commission, to deal with
issues. For example, in catchment-based water manage-
ment, solutions in each of these six categories may in-
clude: (1) introducing real-time monitoring systems to
ensure that individual users do not exceed their alloca-
tions; (2) public naming of defectors (noncooperators) or
the creation of better legal instruments to fine defectors
for overuse; (3) communicating scientific understanding
to make future benefits of water conservation clearer;
(4) helping farmers to use less water more effectively,
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for example, by leveling fields; (5) setting up meetings
with individuals from other, more successful catchment
management groups to share success stories; and (6) cre-
ating a new governing body, such as a catchment man-
agement authority, with the appropriate mandate from
stakeholders.
Barry & Bateman (1996), building on Platt’s sugges-
tions in the context of social diversity problems, em-
phasize the importance of considering multiple levels of
analysis. They grouped solutions to social dilemmas into
three categories: (1) informational solutions, which are
directed at the social-cognitive processes of individuals;
(2) group-structure solutions, which directly manage the
structure and process of the organization and/or sub-
units; and (3) structural solutions, which seek to modify
the dynamics of a dilemma or an SES trap by redefining
its structure. For water management, informational so-
lutions might change people’s perceptions of the short-
and long-term costs of their water use; group-structure
solutions might include holding stakeholder workshops
to build better social relations, or reorganizing the mon-
itoring process of the catchment management authority
and giving it greater authority to intervene; while struc-
tural solutions might involve fundamental changes to the
nature of the problem, for example, by encouraging farm-
ers to shift away from water-intensive cropping systems
to other crops, livestock, or livelihoods.
Van Lange et al. (2013) and Balliet et al. (2011) provide
more recent reviews of potential solutions to dilemma
situations. As they point out, Ostrom’s design principles
for institutions (Ostrom 1990; Ostrom et al. 2007) pro-
vide a well-established basis for resolving many take-
some dilemmas. Notable features of Ostrom’s principles
include an emphasis on local sanctioning and reward,
monitoring, and easily accessible conflict resolution. In-
ternal mechanisms such as effective communication,
building internal trust, and facilitating reciprocity among
the people who face social dilemma and trap situations
can play key roles in resolving them (Van Lange et al.
2013).3
Scaling dilemma and SES trap solutions to larger scales
remains a difficult problem, and there are relatively few
examples of successful global solutions. The Montreal
Protocol and the resolution of the acid rain problem are
perhaps the best examples (Levy 1995; Beron et al. 2003).
As Ostrom herself acknowledged, each situation has its
own unique elements, and there are no panaceas for
natural resource management. Greater awareness of so-
cial dilemmas and SES traps, and some of their potential
solutions, can nonetheless help those who are involved
in managing natural resources to work more effectively
within the sociopolitical contexts of conservation, policy,
and management.
Future directions
I have argued that understanding and achieving coop-
eration is fundamental to the success of conservation.
Although the principles of cooperation are well estab-
lished (Dawes 1980; Barry & Bateman 1996) and have
been successfully applied in many conservation contexts
(Brown 2002), research on cooperation in conservation
has a tendency to explore the same principles repeatedly
in different case studies without drawing on mechanistic
models or advancing theory. For example, Ostrom’s prin-
ciples for the community-based natural resource manage-
ment of common property resources have been shown to
work well under some circumstances, but remain prob-
abilistic (correlative) rather than diagnostic (mechanism-
based; Cox et al. 2010). Uncertainties about the impacts
of heterogeneity and scale on cooperation, both within
groups and spatially across landscapes, remain largely un-
resolved. With globalization, climate change, and trans-
boundary resource management becoming increasingly
important in many ecosystems, building successful coop-
eration at broad scales has become one of the most impor-
tant conservation concerns of our time. Given the mech-
anistic overlap between social dilemmas and SES traps,
the availability of a large number of empirical case stud-
ies of cooperation in conservation, and growing under-
standings of individual-level mechanisms in behavioral
economics, the time appears ripe for the development of
quantitative systems models and hypothesis-based explo-
ration of proposed mechanisms of conservation cooper-
ation, coupled with broad-scale experiments, as ways of
improving conservation theory and practice.
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